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Abstract
This paper estimates a stylized search and matching model on data for Australia covering
the period 1978-2008. Using Bayesian methods we ﬁnd that the model does a fairly good job
in replicating the data. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd a large value for the worker’s bargaining power
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1 Introduction
The Australian labour market has performed exceptionally well over the past decades and, in
particular, during the global ﬁnancial crisis. Its unemployment rate is among the lowest in all
OECD countries and structural unemployment remains unaﬀected, while it increases in the OECD.
Moreover, Australia is a perfect example of a small open economy. Therefore, labour market
dynamics in Australia are particularly interesting for economists and policy makers around the
world. It is interesting to compare the results across countries and identify substantial diﬀerences
that cause diﬀerent evolution of key variables. Unfortunately, the search and matching literature
has mainly focused on the United States and Europe.1 In this paper we estimate a canonical search
and matching model for the Australian economy.
This study aims at estimating deep parameters of the search model to shed light on the under-
lying properties and describing cyclical ﬂuctuations using Bayesian techniques. For this purpose,
we will estimate a set of key parameters that drive labour market dynamics. Hence, we provide
evidence for parameters that are otherwise hard to calibrate (such as bargaining power or the elas-
ticity of the matching function), which increases the usefulness of this model to study and predict
labour market dynamics. Further, we analyze the source and size of ﬂuctuations and evaluate the
ability of the search and matching model to replicate cyclical patterns of the Australian labour
market.
We ﬁnd several interesting results. First, we ﬁnd that all parameters are tightly estimated and
shifted away from their respective priors. Therefore, the data set is informative and the parameters
are identiﬁed. The worker’s bargaining power is surprisingly large (roughly 0.8) compared with
other empirical studies that ﬁnd values between 0 and 0.3 for the United States. On average, we
observe a low unemployment rate which is driven by low vacancy posting costs and low - but volatile
- separations. Further, our results indicate that both margins - the creation and the destruction
margin - are subject to large cyclical ﬂuctuations.
Moreover, the estimated model is able to generate the empirically observed second moments
fairly well. The only exception is the volatility of vacancies which is much too low. Nevertheless, the
model replicates a quite strong Beveridge curve, viz. the negative relation between unemployment
and vacancies.
Turning to the driving forces of ﬂuctuations in the labour market, we ﬁnd that out of the
four shocks at hand, we ﬁnd that the technology shock and the separation rate shock are the
main driver of key variables. The technology shock is more important for output and vacancies,
while the separation shock is more important for (un)employment and matches. Overall, we ﬁnd
that labour market variables show a large degree of interdependence. In addition, we ﬁnd that
over the short-run output is driven by technology and separation shocks, while over the long-run
technology shocks clearly dominate. Unemployment is - over the short-run - almost entirely driven
1However, there a two exceptions. Lubik (2011) as well as Lin and Miyamoto (2012) estimate a search and
matching model on unemployment and vacancy data for Hong Kong, Japan respectively.
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by separation shocks, while in the long-run technology innovations explain roughly 20 percent of
variation in unemployment.
The paper by Sheen and Wang (2012) estimates a small-open economy New Keynesian model
with labour market frictions based on Blanchard and Galí (2010). This set-up is diﬀerent to the
search and matching model, since it does not rely on a matching function and vacancy posting.
Here, in each period a constant share of the work force is separated, while hiring is costly for the
ﬁrm. Hiring costs depend on the state of the labour market and creating frictions that generate
equilibrium unemployment. They ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of hiring costs in the Australian labour
market, being in the size of roughly one percent of GDP. Further, they show that the variance
of unemployment is initially mainly driven by the technology shock, while over the long-run the
labour supply preference shock dominates. For output, they ﬁnd a key role for demand shocks
over the short run, while the technology and the labour supply preference shock dominate over the
long-run.
Further, our results add to the ﬁndings by Ponomareva and Sheen (2010) estimating transition
probabilities in the labour market. They ﬁnd that employment-to-unemployment transition rates
are countercyclical but insigniﬁcantly large in a recession. On the contrary, unemployment-to-
employment transitions are procyclical and quite important in a recession. This shows that during
recessions job-ﬁnding rather than job-losing is the key problem.
Our results strongly contradict the ﬁndings by Chindamo and Uren (2010). They use a calibrated
search and matching model to assess its ability to replicate empirically observed second moments.
They ﬁnd that the model is not able to generate enough volatility of key variables. In particular,
the model is not able to match the standard deviation of unemployment and vacancies, as well
as the negative correlation between them, while our model only does a bad job in replicating the
volatility of vacancies. This crucial diﬀerences can be explained by the diﬀerences in methodological
approaches. As we use an estimated instead of a calibrated model, we are able to generate dynamics
that match the empirical observations. As a key diﬀerence, Chindamo and Uren (2010) calibrate
vacancy posting cost to be 0.12, while the estimation gives a value of 0.01.2 Hence, the search and
matching model does, in fact, a fairly good job in replicating observed dynamics.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section derives the model and section 3 presents
the data and calibrates the model and discusses the prior selection. Then, section 4 discusses the
parameter estimates and analyzes the sources of ﬂuctuations in the labour market. Moreover, we
discuss the model’s response to a technology and a separation shock. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Model Derivation
The description of our model economy proceeds in three steps and follows Prescott’s narrative ap-
proach. First, we deﬁne the economy’s preferences and technology and then present the underlying
2Other key parameters such as the opportunity costs in the bargaining process or the separation rate are similar
across the two papers.
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market structure. Finally, we derive the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions and conclude with the
deﬁnition of an equilibrium.
2.1 Preferences and Technology
We now present a general equilibrium model with ﬂexible prices and labour market frictions in
discrete time. Our economy inhibits two diﬀerent agents; households and ﬁrms. The labour mar-
ket is imperfect due to the assumption of search and matching frictions following Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994).
2.1.1 Households
We assume that our economy is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitively-lived, homogeneous house-
holds. Each household consists of a continuum of family members of measure one. They equally
share total income and risk among all family members as in Merz (1995). Households preferences
are represented by the following utility function
Et
∞
t=0
βtγt ln (Ct) , (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and Et denotes the mathematical expectation operator. Con-
sumption is denoted by Ct and γt denotes a preference shock that follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive
process
lnγt = ̺γ ln γt−1 + eγ,t, (2)
where 0 < ̺γ < 1 is the autocorrelation term and its innovation is i.i.d. over time and normally
distributed
eγ,t ∼ N (0, σγ) . (3)
2.1.2 Firms
Our economy is populated by a continuum of identical ﬁrms. They use the following production
technology
Yt = ZtN
α
t , (4)
to produce goods. Here, 0 < α < 1 determines the curvature of technology in labour. Further, Zt
is a Hicks-neutral aggregate technology shock following a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process
lnZt = ̺Z lnZt−1 + eZ,t, (5)
where 0 < ̺Z < 1 is the autocorrelation term and its innovation is i.i.d. over time and normally
distributed
eZ,t ∼ N (0, σZ) . (6)
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2.2 Market Structure
While the good market is perfectly competitive, the labour market is imperfect due to the assump-
tion of search and matching frictions. Trade in the labour market is uncoordinated, costly, and
time-consuming. Search takes place on a discrete and closed market. Workers can be employed or
unemployed. Firms have one job that is either ﬁlled or vacant. If the job is ﬁlled, it is subject to
the probability of being destroyed at the rate ρt. We assume that the separation rate follows an
AR(1) process
lnρt = ̺ρ ln ρt−1 + eρ,t. (7)
Again, the autocorrelation term is denoted by 0 < ̺ρ < 1 and the innovation term, eρ,t, is i.i.d.
over time and normally distributed,
eρ,t ∼ N (0, σρ) . (8)
Along the hiring margin, ﬁrms create jobs at the rate M (Ut, Vt) at the non-state-contingent cost of
c > 0 units of output per vacancy, where M is the homogeneous-of-degree-one-matching-function,
M (Ut, Vt) = mtU
µ
t V
1−µ
t . (9)
We assume that mt gives the time-varying match eﬃciency which is assumed to be driven by an
AR(1) process
lnmt = ̺m lnmt−1 + em,t, (10)
where 0 < ̺m < 1 and em,t is i.i.d. over time and normally distributed,
em,t ∼ N (0, σm) . (11)
Further, µ > 0 is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment and Vt is the
vacancy rate. The vacancy-to-unemployment ratio, θt = Vt/Ut, reﬂects labour market tightness.
Then, the job matching rate is
q (θt) =
M (Ut, Vt)
Vt
= mtθ
−µ
t , (12)
and the job ﬁnding rate is
p (θt) =mtθ
1−µ
t . (13)
Combining entry and exit deﬁnitions yields the evolution of employment
Nt = (1− ρt) (Nt−1 +Mt−1) . (14)
Similarly, the evolution of aggregate unemployment can be written as
Ut = 1−Nt. (15)
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2.3 Optimization and Equilibrium
Optimization of all agents deﬁnes the equilibrium. We start with the households utility maxi-
mization problem and continue with the ﬁrms proﬁt maximization problem. Then, we solve the
bargaining problem between ﬁrm and worker and determine the optimal wage. We conclude with
a deﬁnition of the equilibrium.
2.3.1 Households
We assume that the economy begins with all households having identical ﬁnancial wealth and
consumption histories. This assumption assures that this homogeneity will continue and it allows us
to only consider the optimal decisions of a representative household. The representative household
faces the following budget constraint
Ct + Tt =WtNt + bUt, (16)
where unemployment beneﬁts b are ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes, Tt, whileWt denotes the real wage.
Then, the household maximizes (1) subject to (16), which gives the standard ﬁrst-order condition
for consumption
γt
Ct
= λt, (17)
where λt is the marginal utility of consumption.
2.3.2 Firms
The representative ﬁrm in our economy solves its proﬁt maximization problem by choosing the
optimal path for {Nt, Vt}
∞
t=0 by maximizing
Et
∞
t=0
βtλt [ZtN
α
t −WtNt − cVt] , (18)
subject to the evolution of employment eq. (14). The term in parenthesis gives real revenue depleted
by total wage costs and vacancy posting costs.
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions are
∂Nt : τ t = α
Yt
Nt
−Wt + Et

(1− ρt)βt+1τ t+1

, (19)
∂Vt : c = Et

βt+1(1− ρt)q(θt)τ t+1

, (20)
where βt+1 = β
λt+1
λt
is the stochastic discount factor and τ t is the multiplier on the evolution of
employment. Using these two equations yields the job creation condition
c
q(θt)
= Et

(1− ρt)βt+1

α
Yt+1
Nt+1
−Wt+1 +
c
q(θt+1)

. (21)
The left-hand side of this equation gives the hiring costs which equal the beneﬁts of creating a new
job. The latter depends on the marginal product of labour depleted by the wage and increased by
saved hiring costs in the next period in case of non-separation.
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2.3.3 Wage Bargaining
We will follow the mainstream of the search and matching literature (e.g. Trigari (2006) and
Krause and Lubik (2007)) and assume that wages are determined by individual Nash bargaining.
The surplus created by the match is split by maximizing the Nash product
Wt = argmax
{Wt}

(Wt − Ut)
η (Jt − Vt)
1−η
	
. (22)
The ﬁrst term is the worker’s surplus, the latter term is the ﬁrm’s surplus, and 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 is the
exogenously determined, constant relative bargaining power.
Let us determine the value functions describing the worker’s options, Wt and Ut. In terms of a
Bellman equation the value of being employed for the worker, Wt, is
Wt =Wt + Etβt+1


1− ρt+1

Wt+1 + ρt+1Ut+1

. (23)
The value consists of the wage, the discounted continuation value of being employed in the next
period, and - conditional on being laid-oﬀ - the value of being unemployed, Ut.
This value function can be written as
Ut = b+ Etβt+1


θtq (θt)

1− ρt+1

Wt+1 +

1− θtq (θt)

1− ρt+1

Ut+1

, (24)
which is driven by the value of unemployment payments, b, the discounted continuation value of
being unemployed, and, if she is matched, she receives the value of future employment.
Moreover, let us determine the ﬁrm’s options. Due to a free entry condition the equilibrium
value of Vt will be driven to zero. For the ﬁrm the asset value of the job, Jt, is equal to the
multiplier on the evolution of employment eq. (19). It depends on the real revenue, the wage, and
if the job is not destroyed, the discounted future value. Otherwise, the job is destroyed and hence
has zero value. The asset value is given by
Jt = α
Yt
Nt
−Wt + Et


(1− ρt)βt+1Jt+1

. (25)
Then, the individual real wage satisﬁes the optimality condition
Wt − Ut =
η
1− η
Jt. (26)
Substituting in the value functions gives an explicit expression for the wage
Wt = η

α
Yt
Nt
+ cθt

+ (1− η) b. (27)
The wedge between the real wage and the reservation wage is increasing in every time-dependent
component and the worker’s bargaining power.
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2.3.4 Equilibrium
We deﬁne an equilibrium in our economy as follows.
Deﬁnition
An equilibrium for given initial conditions, the stochastic processes {Zt, ρt, γt,mt} and a set of
prices {Wt}, is a tuple of processes for {Ct, Yt, Vt,Mt, Nt, Ut, θt, λt} such that
1. Household optimality
Given {Wt} the process for {Ct} solve the optimization problem, maximizing (1) subject to
(16).
2. Proﬁt maximization
The processes for {Yt, Vt,Mt,Nt, Ut, θt, λt} solve the ﬁrm maximization problem, maximizing
(18) subject to (12), and (14). Further they obey labour market restrictions (9) and (15).
3. Wage determination
Firm and worker engage in Nash bargaining and wages are set according to (27).
4. Market clearing
In the symmetric equilibrium, factor and goods market clear and any feasible allocation must
satisfy the aggregate resource constraint
Yt = Ct + cVt. (28)
As common in the literature, we assume that the consumption good is used to pay vacancy posting
costs. Furthermore, the government pays unemployment beneﬁts and ﬁnances them by collecting
lump-sum transfers, i.e. runs a balanced budget at all times. Then, the set of equations forming
the equilibrium is linearized around the non-stochastic steady-state.
3 Estimation
3.1 Data
For our estimation the set of available time series consists of output, consumption, employment,
unemployment, wages, vacancies, and investment. All time series are taken from the Reserve
Bank of Australia. Our sample covers the period from 1978:Q3 to 2008:Q2, which gives us 120
observations. We use quarterly, seasonally adjusted series and chain volume measures in 2009/10
Australian Dollar. Then, all time series are written in logarithmic scale and are detrended using a
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with λ = 1600.
Output (GGDPECCVGDP) is measured by the by the gross domestic product and consump-
tion (GGDPECCVPSH) is private household consumption. The time series for employment (GLF-
SEPTSA) and unemployment (GLFSUPSA) are on a monthly basis, aggregated to a quarterly
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basis. Wages (GLCAWE) are measured by the time series for average weekly earnings for all
employees.
Moreover, the time series provided for vacancies (GLFOSVT) is based on survey evidence
covering all Australian employers, except the farm sector and private households.
3.2 Calibration and Prior Selection
The calibration is on a quarterly basis, summarized in table 1.
Table 1: Calibration and prior selection.
Parameter Value Parameter Value Std Family
β 0.99 α 2/3 0.1 Beta
N 0.9 ρ 0.05 0.01 Beta
U 0.1 η 0.5 0.05 Normal
m 0.4 µ 0.4 0.01 Beta
q 0.7 c 0.05 0.01 Gamma
b 0.61
The discount factor β, is set to its standard value of 0.99, implying an interest rate of 4 percent
per annum. The unemployment rate is set to 10 percent, which is larger as the current unemploy-
ment rate in Australia of 5.4 percent. This relatively high value of steady state unemployment
reﬂects the shortcoming of the unemployment rate namely the nonconformity of eﬀective searchers
and unemployed workers as in Cole and Rogerson (1999). Employment is then given by N = 1−U .
Then, steady state matches are given by M = ρ
1−ρN .
The job ﬁnding rate, q, is set to 0.7 which is in line with Chindamo and Uren (2010). Using the
calibrated values, we can use the equation for the law of employment, the matching function, and
the deﬁnition of labour market tightness to ﬁnd the steady state value of labour market tightness,
θ =

1−U
U
ρ
1−ρ
1
m
	 1
1−µ
. Then, vacancies can be found by using V = θU . Further, the value for
unemployment beneﬁts, b, is found by using the job creation condition,
b = α
Y
N
−
c
m
[1− (1− ρ)β]
(1− ρ) (1− η)β
θµ −
η
1− η
κθ. (29)
Given the values of the other parameters, we ﬁnd a value of 0.61 for b, which gives a replacement
ratio, b/W , of 0.89, where steady state wages are taken from eq. (27).
We aim at estimating several deep parameters describing the labour market as well as the
underlying shock processes. In what follows, we describe our prior speciﬁcations.
For the labour share, we choose a beta distribution with mean 2/3 and standard deviation 0.1.
This value is close to the average labour share in Australia (see Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003)).
Vacancy posting costs are assumed to be gamma distributed with mean 0.05 and standard deviation
0.01, which is an average value between low (0.01) and high (0.1) vacancy posting costs.
9
Further, for the bargaining power we impose that it is normally distributed with mean 0.5 and
standard deviation 0.05. Therefore, we assume symmetric bargaining in the ﬁrst place. The prior
density of ρ, the parameter that governs separations in steady state, belongs to the beta family
and has a mean of 0.05 and a standard deviation of 0.01. This prior is in line with the calibration
of Chindamo and Uren (2010). Then, the elasticity of the matching function µ, is assumed to be
beta distributed with mean 0.4 and standard deviation 0.01.
Let us now turn to the priors related to our four exogenous processes. First, we set the priors
for the autocorrelation parameters. We assume that the autocorrelation parameters in the AR
processes follow beta distributions with mean 0.9 and standard deviation 0.05. Finally, all standard
deviations of the underlying shocks are assumed to follow an inverse Gamma distribution with mean
0.1 and standard deviation 1.
4 Results
The empirical (macro) literature focused on developing and applying full information Bayesian
techniques to estimate even large-scale DSGE models. However, there exists a trade-oﬀ between
the estimation of small structural models and the estimation of large structural models. The
estimation of small and therefore stylized models may lead to misspeciﬁcations, while estimating
large models could lead to identiﬁcation problems. Bayesian methods are capable of dealing with
both problems. We apply those standard Bayesian techniques to estimate the search and matching
model presented on Australian labour market data. To obtain our results, we use four MCMC
chains with 250.000 draws each.
4.1 Posteriors
In this section we discuss the posterior estimates and the implications for labour market dynamics.
Table 2 presents the posterior estimates as well as the 95 % conﬁdence bands for the ﬁve deep
parameters and the eight parameters describing the exogenous processes. In addition, ﬁgure 1
presents the prior and posterior density functions for selected parameters. We observe that the
posterior estimates are signiﬁcantly shifted away from the prior assumptions which, given that
all parameters are tightly estimated, implies that the data is informative and the parameters are
identiﬁed.
The posterior mean of the separation rate is 0.07. The 5th and 95th percentiles are 0.05, 0.09
respectively. Furthermore, the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment,
µ, is estimated to be 0.4, with the 5th and 95th percentiles are 0.38, 0.42 respectively. Those two
parameters allow us to draw conclusions about the ins and outs of unemployment. We ﬁnd that
the separation rate is almost half of the estimated rate for the United States by Lubik (2009) of
0.12. Further, the estimated standard deviation of the separation rate in Australia is 0.21, while
it is roughly 0.1 in the U.S. economy. Hence, while separations are low on average, they increase
signiﬁcantly when the economy enters a recession. Moreover, in the following upswing separations
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Figure 1: Prior and posterior density for selected parameters.
decrease as rapidly as before, hence, creating a low mean.
While we have discussed the inﬂow into unemployment, let us turn to the outﬂow of unemploy-
ment. In the search and matching model at hand, it is driven by the creation of new matches. As
we have discussed before, the job matching rate is eq. (12), while the job ﬁnding rate is given by
eq. (13). Both equations are mainly driven by the elasticity parameter, µ, which is much lower
compared with the estimate for the United States of 0.74 by Lubik (2009). A low value of the
elasticity parameter µ implies that on the one hand, the ﬁnding rate reacts more elastically to
changes in labour market tightness. Put diﬀerently, the ﬁnding rate reacts stronger to changes in
the labour market. As a consequence, it is easier for job seekers to exit unemployment compared
to the United States. On the other hand, the matching rate is less sensitive to changes in labour
market conditions and hence, ﬁrms vacancy posting decisions (see the job creation condition eq.
(21)) are less aﬀected by changes in labour market tightness.
Our estimate for vacancy posting costs c, has a median value of 0.01, with the 5th and 95th
percentiles of 0.0098 and 0.0117. In contrast to the existing literature (see e.g. Lubik (2009, 2011))
we are able to identify this parameter. While this parameter is usually calibrated to a value close
to 0.05 for the U.S. we obtain a much lower value of 0.01 for Australia. It implies signiﬁcantly
lower costs of posting vacancies and, hence, ﬁrms have more incentives to post vacancies compared
with the U.S. economy. Further, if the economy enters a recession, ﬁrms will have less incentives to
reduce vacancy posting activities compared with the U.S. economy. Along this line, in the following
upswing low vacancy posting costs will lead to more vacancies posted as in the United States and
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more jobs created.
Next, we want to discuss the estimate for the worker’s bargaining power, η. The posterior mean
is 0.81 and the 95 % conﬁdence interval is [0.79, 0.82]. This result is particularly surprising, as the
estimates for the United States is 0.03. The implications are severe: while in the U.S. almost the
entire surplus goes to the ﬁrm, in Australia 80 percent of the surplus generated by the match goes
to the worker and only 20 percent are left for the ﬁrm. This might explain the low value obtained
for vacancy posting costs, as ﬁrms have less incentives to post vacancies if their share of the surplus
is small. Hence, a low value of vacancy posting costs will compensate for the small surplus share.
The estimate of the elasticity of the production function, α, is 0.92 which implies less curvature
of the production function.
Finally, we want to discuss the posterior estimates of the underlying disturbances. For the auto-
correlation parameters, we ﬁnd that the values are close to 0.9 for most shocks. The only exception
is the shock to the separation rate which shows a persistence coeﬃcient of 0.63. Nevertheless, the
results imply that the search and matching model generates a strong internal propagation mecha-
nism that is able to replicate the persistence in the data, which is in line with the results for the
U.S. by Lubik (2009). However, the relatively low value of persistence in the separation rate is in
contrast with the results by Lubik (2011). He ﬁnds that the separation rate is an autocorrelated
process with AR(1) parameter of 0.86 for Hong Kong. In contrast, Lin and Miyamoto (2012) ﬁnd
a much lower value of persistence (0.31) of the separation shock for Japan. In Australia we ﬁnd an
intermediate value for the exogenous persistence of the separation shock.
For the standard deviation of shocks we ﬁnd that the separation rate shock is the most volatile
one, which is a consistent ﬁnding with the low persistence and our description of the ins and outs
of unemployment. Along this line, we ﬁnd that the shock to the match eﬃciency is also much more
volatile than the preference shock and the technology shock.
In Japan, we ﬁnd that technology and separation shocks have nearly the same standard deviation
of 0.03. Therefore, the technology shock in Australia is three times as volatile in Japan, while the
separation shock is ﬁve times less volatile. In summation, we can draw the conclusion that the
Table 2: Posterior estimates.
Parameter Mean 5 % 95 % Parameter Mean 5 % 95 %
ρ 0.07 0.05 0.09 ̺m 0.86 0.78 0.93
µ 0.40 0.38 0.42 ̺γ 0.90 0.86 0.95
c 0.01 0.01 0.01 σZ 0.01 0.01 0.01
η 0.81 0.79 0.82 σρ 0.16 0.11 0.21
α 0.93 0.90 0.97 σm 0.10 0.05 0.14
̺Z 0.92 0.87 0.97 σγ 0.08 0.04 0.12
̺ρ 0.63 0.55 0.72
Australian labour market has a low average unemployment rate driven by low vacancy posting
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Figure 2: Unconditional variance decomposition.
costs and low but volatile separations. Both margins - the creation and the destruction margin -
are subject to large cyclical ﬂuctuations.
4.2 Variance Decomposition
In the following we want to discuss the main driving forces of business cycle ﬂuctuations in the
Australian labour market. Figure 2 presents the unconditional variance decomposition.
We only present the unconditional variance decomposition for four variables, as the decompo-
sition for output and consumption is virtually identical as well as the decomposition for unemploy-
ment and employment is identical. Further, and by construction, separations are entirely driven
by the underlying exogenous process.
We ﬁnd that output is mainly driven by the technology shock (almost 60 percent of total
variation), while the separation shock explains roughly 25 percent. The remaining 15 percent are
jointly explained by the preference and matching shock. Compared with the U.S. we ﬁnd that the
technology shock is slightly less important, as it explains 71 percent of variation in output according
to Lubik (2009).
For unemployment, we ﬁnd that the technology shock explains almost 20 percent of total vari-
ation, while the separation shock seems to be the main driver, explaining more than 50 percent.
Further, the remaining percentages are explained by the preference shock and the matching shock.
As for output, the preference shock is slightly more important than the matching shock. This con-
tradicts the ﬁnding of Lubik (2009) that the matching shock explains 92 percent of the variation
in unemployment in the United States.
Turning to vacancies, we ﬁnd that the technology shock drives roughly 50 percent of the vari-
ation, while the preference shock explains a share of more than 30 percent. The matching shock
is much more important than the separation shock, while they jointly only account for roughly 20
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Figure 3: Conditional variance decomposition for 60 quarters.
percent. This ﬁnding is consistent with the ﬁndings for the U.S. by Lubik (2009), which can be
explained by the channel through which the preference shock (as being a demand side shock) op-
erates. It mainly aﬀects the stochastic discount factor in the job creation condition and, therefore,
the discounted value of a job.
Matches are mainly driven by the separation shock, while the technology and preference shock
jointly explain roughly 30 percent of variation. Surprisingly, the matching shock only explains as
little as 15 percent of total variation in matches.
Let us now turn to the conditional variance decomposition of key variables over 60 simulated
quarters presented in ﬁgure 3.
For output, we observe that the technology shock and the separation shock are almost equally
important on impact, while in the long-run the technology shock clearly is the main driver of total
variation. Moreover, we observe that for roughly ﬁve quarters the separation shock even explains
more variation than the technology shock before the technology shock takes over. Matching and
preference shock explain almost no variation in output on impact, but gain over time.
For (un)employment we ﬁnd that the separation shock explains almost all of the variation on
impact. However, its share of total variation decreases rather quickly and converges to roughly
60 percent as explained above. On the contrary, the other three shocks generate no variation on
impact, but quickly become more and more important. As discussed, the technology shock is more
important than the preference shock and the matching shock. The composition of variation in
vacancies does not vary too strongly over time. We already know that the technology shock and
the preference shock jointly explain roughly 80 percent of total variation. The matching shock adds
another 15 percent and the remaining 5 percent are generated by variation in the separation rate.
Over time, the technology and the matching shock become slightly more important, while the two
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Figure 4: Technology shock. Horizontal axes measure quarters, vertical axes deviations from steady
state.
other shock lose some explanatory power.
Finally, the shock to the separation rate explains 50 percent of total variation in matches over
the long-run, but is almost of no importance on impact. It strongly gains over time, as the other
three shocks jointly, and at the same pace, lose importance. Each one of the remaining three shocks
explains around 20 percent of variation, where the technology shock explains a bit more and the
matching shock explains a bit less than the preference shock.
Out of the four shocks, we ﬁnd that the technology shock and the separation rate shock are the
main driver of key variables. The technology shock is more important for output and vacancies,
while the separation shock is more important for (un)employment and matches. We also ﬁnd dif-
ferences in the importance of shocks over the short- and long-run. While technology and separation
shock are equally important for the variation in output over the short-run, the technology shock
clearly dominates over the long-run. Similarly, unemployment is mainly driven by innovations to
the separation rate in the short-run, while the other shocks gain in the long-run. Overall, we ﬁnd
that labour market variables show a large degree of interdependence.
4.3 Impulse Responses
In this section we want to discuss the reaction of our model to innovations in aggregate technology
and the separation rate. We choose those two shocks as they appear to be the main drivers of
the Australian labour market. Figure 4 presents the estimated impulse response functions for a
positive technology shock.
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Figure 5: Separation shock. Horizontal axes measure quarters, vertical axes deviations from steady
state.
An increase in productivity shifts the production frontier outside and the ﬁrm is able to produce
more output. Higher output and consumption will create an incentive for the ﬁrm to raise the
employment level. As the job destruction margin is exogenous, the entire adjustment process has
to take place via the job creation margin. Hence, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms start posting vacancies such
that the number of matches increases. The job ﬁlling (or matching) rate decreases, as vacancies
increase more strongly than matches do. Intuitively, if a ﬁrm posts a vacancy it decreases the
probability for other ﬁrms to ﬁll a vacancy (congestion externality). This can also be seen in the
increase in labour market tightness. Overall, we ﬁnd that increased vacancy posting activities lead
to higher employment and lower unemployment. Finally, optimal wage setting implies that the
ﬁrm and worker share surpluses and, hence, wages increase in response to the shock.
Further, we observe a large hump-shaped behaviour in all variables but wages and matches.
This is another indication that the - stylized - model generates enough internal propagation to
generate persistent adjustment paths.
Let us turn to ﬁgure 5 presenting the response of our model economy to an innovation in the
separation rate.
Intuitively, an increase in the separation rate will increase the outﬂow of jobs. Hence, we observe
that unemployment increases, as the ﬁrm is not able to counter the adverse eﬀects of separations by
increased hiring (as hiring will only be eﬀective in the next period). As a consequence, employment
decreases which directly spills-over to the production function, shifting the production frontier
inside. Hence, output and consumption decrease. Vacancies decrease as the marginal product of
labour decreases and, mainly, because the separation rate increases which reduces the expected,
discounted value of a worker. Further, lower vacancy posting and higher unemployment decrease
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labour market tightness. Higher unemployment implies a larger pool of job searchers which causes
negative search externalities for other searchers, i.e. reduces the job ﬁnding probability of all other
searchers. Nevertheless, the increase in unemployment is larger than the drop in vacancies such
that, via the matching function, more matches are created, since more searchers are on the market.
Therefore, matches increase and the job ﬁlling rate increases. Finally, a lower marginal product
of labour and lower labour market tightness decrease the cyclical component in the wage equation
driving dower optimal wages. Again, we ﬁnd a large internal propagation mechanism, generating
large hump-shaped behaviours.
4.4 Second Moments
In this section we want to assess the ability of our estimated search and matching model to replicate
observed second moments. Table 3 presents the relative standard deviations of key variables w.r.t.
output and the corresponding values taken from the estimated model. The moments obtained for
the data are constructed from the time series discussed in section 3.1. We write the time series in
logarithmic terms, HP-ﬁlter them, and compute the standard deviation of each time series relative
to output.
We ﬁnd that the standard deviation of unemployment in the data (7.20) is fairly well replicated
by the model (7.07). Similarly, we ﬁnd that the model replicates the volatility of employment fairly
well (0.96 vs. 0.79). However, while the model ﬁts unemployment, it fails to match the volatility
of vacancies. In the data, the standard deviation is 13.26 but is 5.23 in the model. This is a
consequence of our estimate for the bargaining power η. It seems to be a broad consensus (see e.g.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)) that a low bargaining power and a high outside option are needed
to replicate the second moment of vacancies. As we estimate a very large value of the bargaining
power, the model fails to match the volatility of vacancies. This also implies that the model can
not match the volatility of labour market tightness (18.91 vs. 10.02).
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the model does a good job in replicating the standard deviation of
wages (0.84 vs. 0.60). Finally, the model is able to generate the negative correlation between
unemployment and vacancies, the well-known Beveridge curve. However, the Beveridge curve
generated by the model is signiﬁcantly less strong as in the data (-0.68 vs. -0.31).
4.5 Robustness
Our results show that the technology shock and the separation rate shock are the main driver
of labour market dynamics in Australia. In this section, we want to check whether our results
are robust to using other shocks then the separation rate shock. Further, we can ensure that
the model with separation shocks is the best speciﬁcation to explain the data. For this purpose,
table 4 presents the point estimates for key parameters for ﬁve models and the log-likelihood. The
benchmark results are the one discussed above, the next two models use a shock to the bargaining
power, η, and a shock to the vacancy posting costs, c, instead of the separation shock. The last
two models additionally use a shock to the bargaining power, vacancy posting costs respectively.
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Table 3: Second moments: standard deviation relative to output.
Variable Data Model
U 7.20 7.07
V 13.26 5.23
N 0.96 0.79
θ 18.91 10.02
W 0.84 0.60
corr (U, V ) -0.68 -0.31
Table 4: Robustness - posterior estimates.
Parameter Benchmark η c Add η Add c
ρ 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05
µ 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.40
c 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.13
η 0.81 0.51 0.56 0.54 0.57
LLN 735.96 1261.87 1244.77 1275.23 1250.80
We ﬁnd that the separation rate and the match eﬃciency are stable across the diﬀerent ap-
proaches. However, we ﬁnd that the vacancy posting costs are much higher (roughly ten times)
as in the benchmark model. The values of roughly 0.1 are in line with the calibration used in
Chindamo and Uren (2010). This value is twice as large as the value obtained by Lubik (2009) for
the U.S.. Further, the bargaining power, η, varies between 0.51 (symmetric bargaining) and 0.81.
However, still signiﬁcantly larger than the estimate for the U.S. of 0.03.
One of the shortcomings of the benchmark model is that it fails to generate enough volatility of
vacancies. Our robustness checks reveal that a combination of higher vacancy posting costs (around
0.1) and symmetric bargaining in fact doubles the standard deviation compared to the benchmark
model. Along this line, also the volatility of unemployed increases by roughly 50 percent compared
with the benchmark model. This ﬁnding should be intuitive. A smaller bargaining power for
workers will leave a larger share of the surplus to the ﬁrm, hence, creating more incentives to react
to exogenous disturbances. As it turns out, this eﬀect dominates the adverse eﬀects on vacancy
posting created by larger vacancy posting costs.
Finally, although we ﬁnd signiﬁcant variation across diﬀerent model speciﬁcations, our bench-
mark model, with low vacancy posting costs and a large bargaining power, generates the lowest
log-likelihood of all models. Therefore, our benchmark model explains the observed dynamics bet-
ter than the other speciﬁcations. Put diﬀerently, it seems that the data prefers the model with the
separation shock and then requires low vacancy posting costs and a high bargaining power.
18
5 Conclusion
This paper estimates a canonical search and matching model on data for Australia over the period
1978-2008 using Bayesian methods. We estimate deep parameters to discuss underlying properties
and cyclical ﬂuctuations. Several ﬁndings stand out. The worker’s bargaining power is surprisingly
large compared to other studies. On average, we observe a low unemployment rate which is driven
by low vacancy posting costs and low - but volatile - separations. Further, our results indicate that
both margins - the creation and the destruction margin - are subject to large cyclical ﬂuctuations.
Moreover, the estimated model is able to generate the empirically observed second moments
fairly well. The only exception is the volatility of vacancies which is much too low. This is mainly
due to the large value of the bargaining power. Nevertheless, the model replicates a quite strong
Beveridge curve. The model is able to replicate the dynamics of key labour market variables, such
as (un)employment and wages.
We ﬁnd that the technology shock and the separation rate shock are the main driver of business
cycle ﬂuctuations. The technology shock is more important for output and vacancies, while the
separation shock is more important for (un)employment and matches. In addition, we ﬁnd that
over the short-run output is driven by technology and separation shocks, while over the long-run
technology shocks clearly dominate. Unemployment is - over the short-run - almost entirely driven
by separation shocks, while in the long-run technology innovations become quite important as well.
A robustness check to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of exogenous disturbances shows that the data prefers
the model with the separation shock.
We want to stress two limiting factors that are not included in our estimation. First, the model
does not account for changes in the institutional background. For example, in 1996 and 2004 the
employment protection legislation index (constructed by the OECD) increased signiﬁcantly, which
is not accounted for. In general, those structural changes may have large eﬀects on the dynamics and
transmission channels in the labour market. Second, the Australian labour market is characterized
by over-qualiﬁcation. The OECD reports that roughly 40 percent of Australian workers possess
higher qualiﬁcations as required. This mismatch creates signiﬁcant costs for ﬁrms. On the one
hand, ﬁrms face additional hiring costs as they have to screen the worker more intensively and
might have to change job requirements and wages. On the other hand, workers overqualiﬁed for
their jobs are more likely to provide less eﬀort due to less satisfaction and are more likely for
on-the-job-search; both factors reducing labour productivity.
Finally, Karanassou and Sala (2010) show that capital accumulation and the international
role played by the Australian economy are crucial factors in explaining the behaviour of the labour
market between 1990 and the early 2000s. However, a sneak peak on future research shows that the
introduction of capital into the search and matching model does not signiﬁcantly alter the point
estimates. Furthermore, future research should consider real wage rigidity and New Keynesian
elements, as Sheen and Wang (2012) show that demand side shocks seem to be of signiﬁcant
importance for ﬂuctuations.
19
References
[1] Bentolila, S. and Saint-Paul, G., 2003. Explaining Movements in the Labour Share. The B.E.
Journal of Macroeconomics, 1: 9.
[2] Blanchard, O. Galí, J., 2010. labour Markets and Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Model
with Unemployment. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(2): 1-30.
[3] Chindamo, P. and Uren, L., 2010. Vacancies and Unemployment in Australia. Australian
Economic Review, 43(2): 136-152.
[4] Cole, H. L. and Rogerson, R., 1999. Can the Mortensen-Pissarides Model Match the Business
Cycle Facts? International Economic Review, 40(4): 933-960.
[5] Hagedorn, M. and Manovskii, I., 2008. The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment
and Vacancies Revisited. American Economic Review, 98(4): 1692-1706.
[6] Karanassou, M. and Sala, H., 2010. Labour Market Dynamics in Australia: What Drives
Unemployment? The Economic Record, 86(273): 185-209.
[7] Krause, M. U. and Lubik, T. A., 2007. The (Ir)relevance of Real Wage Rigidity in the New
Keynesian Model with Search Frictions”. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54: 706-727.
[8] Lin, C.-Y. and Miyamoto, H., 2012. Estimating a Search and Matching Model of the Aggregate
Labour Market in Japan. CIRJE Discussion Paper, No. F-850.
[9] Lubik, T. A., 2011. Aggregate Labour Market Dynamics in Hong Kong. Paciﬁc Economic
Review (forthcoming).
[10] Lubik, T. A., 2009. Estimating a Search and Matching Model of the Aggregate Labour Market.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, 95(2), 101-120.
[11] Merz, M., 1995. Search in the Labour Market and the Real Business Cycle. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 36 (November): 269—300.
[12] Mortensen, D. T. and Pissarides, C. A., 1994. Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory
of Unemployment. Review of Economic Studies, 61(3): 397-415.
[13] Ponomareva, N. and Sheen, J., 2010. Cyclical Flows in Australian Labour Markets. The Eco-
nomic Record, 86(1): 35-48.
[14] Sheen, J. and Wang, B., 2012. An Estimated Small open Economy Model with Labour Market
Frictions. Mimeo.
[15] Trigari, A., 2006. The Role of Search Frictions and Bargaining for Inﬂation Dynamics. IGIER
Working paper, No. 304.
20
